From Policy Signaling to Implementation: The Impact of Trump’s 2025 Reciprocal Tariff Policy on State-Level Job Approval in The United States

Authors

  • Haolin Wang Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Macau, Macau, China

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/hg0cdm55

Keywords:

Reciprocal Tariffs; Presidential Approval; Policy Signaling; Time Series Analysis; Spatial Politics.

Abstract

The implementation of economic policies often exerts far-reaching effects across multiple dimensions, influencing not only the economic sector but also the political and social spheres. In this context, in April 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump introduced the "Reciprocal Tariffs" policy as a key economic measure during his second term. The policy's implementation led to significant shifts in public approval across U.S. states. This study utilizes tracking data on public approval of the president across U.S. states from January to July 2025 to systematically assess the dynamic impact of the policy, from its signaling phase to its formal implementation. The analysis employs three distinct methodologies—paired sample t-tests, Interrupted Time Series Analysis (ITSA), and a two-way fixed-effects panel regression model—to provide comparative validation of the results. The study quantitatively examines approval changes before and after the policy intervention and incorporates spatial visualization to identify regional differences. The findings indicate a significant nationwide decline in average approval ratings following the policy announcement, with no significant differences observed across states with varying political leanings. Quantitative analysis of the intervention effects reveals a sharp decline in approval ratings in the short term, followed by a modest recovery, though the approval ratings did not return to pre-intervention levels. From a spatial perspective, coastal and urbanized regions, characterized by higher voter diversity and a stronger inclination towards liberalism, exhibited more pronounced declines in approval ratings. In contrast, some states in the Midwest and South, owing to stronger personal support for President Trump, showed relative stability. This study highlights the stage-specific impact, time-lag effects, and regional heterogeneity of economic policy signals on public opinion, providing empirical evidence for understanding the political effects of federal economic policies while offering valuable insights for future policy design and public communication strategies.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

[1] The White House. (2025, February 13). Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Announces “Fair and Reciprocal Plan” on Trade.

[2] Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2020). The China shock: Learning from labor market adjustment to large changes in trade. Annual Review of Economics, 12, 205–240.

[3] Bailey, M. A., Strezhnev, A., & Voeten, E. (2017). Estimating dynamic state preferences from United Nations voting data. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(2), 430–456.

[4] Blonigen, B. A. (2021). Trade policy and economic welfare. Journal of Economic Literature, 59(1), 1–31.

[5] BNP Paribas Economic Research. (2025, April 7). “Reciprocal” Tariffs Are Bad for World Growth and Worse for the US.

[6] Duch, R. M., & Stevenson, R. T. (2008). The economic vote: How political and economic institutions condition election results. Cambridge University Press.

[7] EIG. (2025). Rural America and Trump's 2024 election results. Economic Innovation Group. Retrieved from https://eig.org/rural-america/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[8] Fearon, J. D. (1997). Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(1), 68–90.

[9] Feigenbaum, J. J., & Hall, A. B. (2015). The political economy of the United States’ trade policy. Journal of Politics, 77(1), 194–209.

[10] Fetzer, T., & Schwarz, C. (2022). Trade Wars and Election Interference. Review of International Organizations, 17, 593–630.

[11] Gartzke, E., Li, Q., & Boehmer, C. (2001). Investing in the peace: Economic interdependence and international conflict. International Organization, 55(2), 391–438.

[12] HarrisX for Harvard CAPS/Harris Poll. (2025, April 9). Americans split on Trump’s tariffs; most expect higher prices and a short-term recession.

[13] Investigate Midwest. (2025, June 13–19). Trump’s election and support in farming counties. Investigate Midwest. Retrieved from https://investigatemidwest.org/2024/11/13/trump-election-farming-counties-trade-war/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[14] Harvard CAPS/Harris Poll. (2025, June). Trump’s approval rating in urban areas. Harvard CAPS/Harris Poll. Retrieved from https://harvardharrispoll.com/press-release-june-2025/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[15] Kucuksenel, S., & Gulseven, O. (2020). Electoral systems and international trade policy. Public Choice, 184, 237–256.

[16] Lewis‑Beck, M. S., & Nadeau, R. (2011). Economic voting theory: Testing new dimensions. Electoral Studies, 30(2), 288–294.

[17] Lewis‑Beck, M. S., & Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 183–219.

[18] Lohmann, S. (1993). A signaling model of informative and manipulative political action. American Political Science Review, 87(2), 319–333.

[19] Margalit, Y. (2011). Costly but peaceable: The effect of the Iraq war on presidential approval. American Political Science Review, 105(1), 61–80.

[20] Morning Consult (Eli Yokley). (2025, March 11). Trump is losing trust on the economy amid trade war.

[21] Morning Consult (Eli Yokley). (2025, July 22). Few Americans back Trump’s new reciprocal tariffs as opposition grows.

[22] Morrill, R., Knopp, L., & Brown, M. (2007). Anomalies in red and blue: Exceptionalism in American electoral geography. Political Geography, 26, 525–553.

[23] Nebraska TV. (2025, April 10). Midwest farmers brace for trade war, but broad rural support for Trump remains. Nebraska TV. Retrieved from https://nebraska.tv/news/ntvs-grow/trump-enjoys-broad-rural-support-but-some-midwest-farmers-brace-for-trade-war?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[24] Nomura Research Institute (NRI). (2025, April 3). Trump Administration Announces Reciprocal Tariffs: 24% Additional Tariff Lowers Japan's GDP by 0.59%.

[25] Petrocik, J. R. (1996). Issue ownership in presidential elections, with a 1980 case study. American Journal of Political Science, 40(3), 825–845.

[26] Politico / Marquette University Law School Poll. (2025, May 21). Americans remain wary of Trump's handling of the economy.

[27] Steinberg, F. & Anderson, J. (2025, April 8). The Possible European Response to Trump’s “Reciprocal” Tariffs. CSIS Analysis.

[28] Stevenson, R. T., & Duch, R. M. (2011). The Global Economy, Competency, and the Economic Vote. Journal of Politics, 72(1), 105–123.

[29] Tomz, M. (2007). Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach. International Organization, 61(4), 821–840.

[30] Wang, J., & Kashlak, A. B. (2021). Local statistics for spatial panel models with application to the US electorate. Spatial Economics, 10, 87–105.

[31] Wikipedia. (2025). Opinion polling on the second Donald Trump administration. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_on_the_second_Donald_Trump_administration?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[32] Wikipedia. (2025, April). 50501 protests in April 2025. Wikipedia. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/50501_protests_in_April_2025?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[33] Wikipedia. (2025, April). 50501 protests in major coastal cities. Wikipedia. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/50501_protests_in_April_2025?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Downloads

Published

09-12-2025

How to Cite

Wang, H. (2025). From Policy Signaling to Implementation: The Impact of Trump’s 2025 Reciprocal Tariff Policy on State-Level Job Approval in The United States. Journal of Education, Humanities and Social Sciences, 60, 71-80. https://doi.org/10.54097/hg0cdm55